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Abstract 10 
G. Bateson believed that the scientific school of the future would be ‘ecology of mind’. The first aim of this 11 
paper is to understand what he meant by ‘mind’, and the other is to understand how this concept emerged in 12 
his thought, i.e., how its meaning would become more flexible throughout his life and work. Furthermore, we 13 
will approach the epistemological implications of ecology of mind for scientific education in the West. 14 
Bateson’s concept of mind emerged when he became aware (in 1926) of his own way of thinking, i.e., of his 15 
immense abductive capacity. This led him to search for patterns of similarity and difference between 16 
organisms (like in homology). Later, he identified this thought process as being abstract and formal, relating 17 
not just facts but also ideas. Afterwards, Bateson developed criteria for us to consider a system as being 18 
mental, with special emphasis on living and cybernetic systems.  19 
 20 
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Introduction 24 
The more one reads Bateson, the more impressed at the depth and breath of his insights one becomes. As his 25 
daughter Mary-Catherine observed (foreword, Bateson, 1972), for many readers Bateson’s thought gradually 26 
shifted throughout his life, constantly introducing new concepts into his theoretical work; to others, he would 27 
always address the same issues but in different manners. I find myself closer to the latter position, though he 28 
did indeed continually create new concepts throughout his multifaceted life in science. However, the novelty 29 
can be understood as emerging in an attempt to optimise the pattern of his own thinking, very much like the 30 
“stochastic process” that he identified in  living beings' learning (Bateson, 1979, chapter VI).  31 
Still, reading Bateson in our digitalised and post-structuralist era presents a special challenge, as we look back 32 
to his thinking on the nature of structure that he was advancing in his first texts, dating around 1936, and in 33 
Naven. Clearly ahead of his time, yet much of what he was trying to get at remains difficult to grasp. The 34 
tentative character of theoretical work corresponds to his eagerness to effectively communicate and share his 35 
thoughts with a scientific community able to appreciate what he was endeavouring to do. As confessed by 36 
many of those with which he initially worked, he wasn't generally successful in this (Lipset, 1980). To begin 37 
with, Bateson’s daring ideas on the structuring of mind were often difficult to coordinate with the boundaries 38 
of the scientific research being done by his colleagues. It is, with special (but not exclusive) focus given to his 39 
Steps to an Ecology of Mind  and with these ideas in view, that I should like to turn my attention in this essay.   40 
 41 
 42 
1 ‘Mind’ as a way of thinking 43 
 44 
Bateson’s mode of thinking is founded on his understanding of the world, especially of the living world. From 45 
it he sought to derive abstract and formal relations rather than to focus on the content and meaning given to 46 
things/words. Bateson possessed an enormous capacity to establish formal inferences of the abductive kind. 47 
These, which do not possess the logic rigor of deductive inference (‘I think, thus I exist’), are richer in terms 48 
of creativity and evocation of new and previously unthought associations. For him, abduction allows to 49 
establish formal connections between contexts that – in the eye of other beholders – make no sense, since they 50 
are focused in the message of the content and not in the formal relation of its contexts, or of the contexts of the 51 
contexts: "[…] that my own mental processes had certain characteristics; that the sayings, actions, and 52 
organization of the Iamtul [indigeneous people of Papua New Guinea, studied by Bateson] had certain 53 
characteristics; and that the abstraction, “ethos”, performed some role – catalyst, perhaps – in easing the 54 
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relation between these two specificities, my mind and the data which I myself had collected" (Bateson, 1972, 55 
p. 108). 56 
Another fundamental characteristic in Bateson’s way of thinking is assuming that there are no articulated 57 
messages (written, oral, digital, mathematical, etc) – including of the scientist – that do not emerge from the 58 
observer, of his life experiences, beliefs and paradigmatic training. In effect, the last part of Naven (1936) 59 
practically constitutes an apology for not being able to study the Iamtul without him being himself one of 60 
them! The assumption of the scientist's intervention in his own research: there is always a mind that produces 61 
messages; they are neither neutral nor objective, even in the domain of scientific exploration. 62 
In 1926, Gregory Bateson established an analogy between homology and homonomy and realised that he 63 
was thinking in a different key: "So far as I was concerned […] the idea was new and I thought of it myself. I 64 
felt that I had discovered how to think" (Bateson, 1972, pp. 80-81). In effect, he perceived that an analogy can 65 
be recognised in the two modes of classification that, in themselves, were structured on the basis of analogy. 66 
In other words, he multiplied two ideas, each of which had an implied multiplication
1
.  Thus, homology 67 
establishes formal relations between parts of an organism (or between organisms) with different functions. On 68 
the other hand, homonomy relates to words that are written and pronounced in the same manner, but possess 69 
different meanings. Therefore, both homonomy and homology are analogies. 70 
This manner of thinking allowed Bateson to establish formal connections between different entities.  71 
In one of his latter works (Bateson, 1979), he further establishes a relationship between ontogenetic 72 
learning and filogenetic evolution, which may remind us of Piaget. However, whilst in Piaget the former was 73 
heavily conditioned by the latter, in Bateson both were immersed, and emerged from, the Mind, as we will 74 
see. 75 
 76 
 77 
2 ‘Mind’ as a way of communicating – the living world 78 
 79 
In his first work, Naven, Bateson recognises the importance of the inspiration provided by some of his peers 80 
(and former professors) in regard to his research in Anthropology. In his later works, his intellectual affiliation 81 
encompasses Cybernetics (of the second order, as it was later nicknamed), theory of systems, theories of 82 
communication, and always accompanying him, Russell/Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica, already 83 
explicitly acknowledged in Naven. All the scientific approaches in the several areas to which he contributed  84 
(e.g.: psychiatry, psychology and ethology), reflect the epistemological framework that grew from these 85 
influences and interests. In regard to this, Bateson says the following:  86 
‘Now I want to talk about the other significant historical event which has happened in my 87 
lifetime, approximately in 1946-47. This was the growing together of a number of ideas which 88 
had developed in different places during World War II. [..]All these separate developments in 89 
different intellectual centres dealt with communicational problems, especially with the problem 90 
of what sort of a thing is an organized system. […] One of the roots of cybernetics goes back to 91 
Whitehead and Russel and what is called the Theory of Logical Types.’ (Bateson 1972, pp. 482-92 
483). 93 
                                                          
1
 According to Bateson, the ideas result of a multiplication of ideas, or of the mental multiplication of empirical facts. 
Arithmetic only works when we wish to relate things that belong to the same class, but if we seek to obtain new 
knowledge, relating things of different classes (e.g.: time and kilometres), we have to multiply (which gives the measure 
of the taximeter) (Bateson, 1972, first metalogue). 
Thus, relating the parts of an organism with different functions (e.g.: a hand with human eyes) demands a multiplication 
whose result could be ‘symmetry’. In the same way, establishing connections amongst words with distinct meanings also 
implies a multiplication from which ‘the same sound’ or ‘the same spelling’ may result. 
But Gregory’s way of thinking goes beyond abstraction when it establishes links between classes of phenomena at a 
superior level: not just at a functional level, but at the level of logic classification: homology belongs to logical inferences 
within the realm of morphology and homonomy to the realm of human communication. 
What he is going to argue throughout his life is that we can multiply two types of logic, as long as we understand that 
both are framed by a wider abstract and formal reality that envelops them. Thus, ideas cannot be quantified, since they 
are not the product of arithmetic sums.  
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The world that Bateson was most interested in was that of living beings of the creaturas, opposing the 94 
pleroma, following Jung's  thinking  according to the Gnostics (Bateson, 1979, p. 7; Bateson 1972, p. 360)
2
. 95 
What interested him was the “self-organising” character of living beings and how they communicated with 96 
one another. One of the key features of creaturas is the capacity of producing ideas, that is, differences, in the 97 
monotonous and achromatic world of pleroma. In regards to this question, Bateson appreciated Kant’s 98 
thought, for whom noumena, although existing and the origin of the a priori categories of knowing and 99 
understanding, was beyond the purview of scientific research (Bateson, 1972: 461). That which approximates 100 
Bateson and Kant is, however, not really the aprioristic dimension of scientific knowledge, but the profoundly 101 
subjective foundations of knowing by any living being. The comprehensive scope of Bateson’s notion of 102 
“ecology of mind” is largely based on this assumption. For this reason, the domain of ideas does not belong 103 
exclusively to science, but rather to the communicative aptitude of all living beings, to which - it must be 104 
noted - science and scientists also belong. All messages between living beings are characterized by a set of 105 
differences agreed upon (generally in an unconscious way) by the living beings that share them amongst 106 
themselves. Thus, in Bateson, the mind can be defined as that which acquires the functionality of producing 107 
differences, ideas. 108 
Beyond ideas, beyond differences there is redundancy, which is directly linked in his thinking to the 109 
concepts ‘frame’, ‘context’ and ‘patterns’. 110 
Taking the studies performed by Shannon
3
 as a basis, redundancy to Bateson corresponds to that which is 111 
not accounted for in human communication, but on which it is founded. If the difference, the idea, brings new 112 
information, it is new because it stands out in a redundant scenario in which the difference emerges. 113 
Redundancy constitutes the frame in which the message is inserted, the context without which the idea would 114 
be meaningless. 115 
The repetitive use of a given type of redundancy as a frame of messages of the same logic kind (e.g.: 116 
communication in a professional environment) transforms this redundancy in a communicative pattern or even 117 
in habit, that is, it transforms into an axiomatic premise of the behavioural kind in that context.  118 
We can can outline Bateson’s thinking that relates mind with communication in the following way: any 119 
message (m1) fits within a frame, which then constitutes a metamessage (mm1) of the previous message (m1); 120 
but the metamessage (mm1) can be a message (m2) framed by another metamessage (mm3), and so on. 121 
Something that is worth emphasising is that this succession of levels affects the meanings of the messages, at 122 
least on a top to bottom dimension. This means that a metamessage (mm3) of a message (m2) ends up 123 
affecting the message (m1) (Bateson, 1972, p. 408). 124 
He was particularly interested in 1) the eventual specificity of human communication in relation to that of 125 
other animals; 2) the characterisation and relation of communicational human forms; 3) the communication of 126 
non-human animals among the same species and between them and us; 4) the dysfunction in human 127 
communication. His collaboration with psychologists and psychiatrists should be understood within his 128 
interest in communication. 129 
In short, we can say that, in regards to (1), Bateson detected that in all animal species there is 130 
communication of the analogical kind (a concept that he then inherited from cybernetics), whereas in humans 131 
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 "My opinion is that the world of creatura, the world of mental process, is both tautological and ecological" (Bateson 
1979, p. 228). In page 106 of the same work, Bateson distinguishes the worlds of pleroma and creatura, as he had done 
in Bateson, 1972 (also later appearing in a book published by one of his daughters after his death: Angels Fear). I return 
to the quotes of these two works: "If I kick a stone, the movement of the stone is energized by the act, but if I kick a dog, 
the behaviour of the dog may indeed be partly conservative – he may travel along a Newtonian trajectory if kicked hard 
enough, but this is mere physics. What is important is that he may exhibit responses that are energized not by the kick but 
by his metabolism; he may turn and bite" (Bateson, 1972, p. 229); "What the receiver (e.g., a sensory end organ) 
responds to is a difference or a change. In Jung’s pleroma there are no differences, no distinctions. It is that non-mental 
realm of description where difference between two parts need never be evoked to explain the response to a third" 
(Bateson, 1979, p. 106). 
3
 "According to Shannon, information is obtainable by the quantity with which a sign occurs within a message, implying 
determinate degrees of “noise” in the process of communication. He did not deny that the message had meaning, neither 
that that meaning could be measured by informative bits a lot less frequent in the message than those that occurred more 
often. However, Shannon want to measure quantitative information that would be obtainable in messages, ignoring its 
eventual meaning as a message" (Oliveira, 2009, p. 24 – my translation). For Bateson, information derives from 
redundancy and the idea from the difference. In my own words, knowledge implies identifying differences in a 
redundancy. 
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it is mostly identified by the kinaesthetic and paralinguistic component. The specific articulated languages of 132 
human beings (verbal and written) were named as ‘digital’. The first are very rich in information but are not 133 
precise concerning the information given; the second are much more precise in regards to the message, but 134 
less rich in terms of profusion of meanings. 135 
Concerning (2), Bateson identified the messages of the analogical kind that are usually 136 
metacommunicative contexts of the messages of the digital kind; thus, the verbal message ‘I’m going to catch 137 
you' has a completely different meaning according to the analogical metamessage in which it is enunciated. 138 
Therefore, we frequently try to digitalise the analogical message, and one who is able to do so with relative 139 
ease is considered dangerous by the human beings that participate with him in the same communicative 140 
context.  141 
Moreover, Bateson argued that the fact that this dimension of human communication was kept unconscious 142 
could have been phylogenetically very important for the survival of the species. This is because it provided a 143 
considerable organic economy to the species (Bateson, 1972, p. 274). 144 
In his understanding, digital language does not directly derive from the analogical one, since with the 145 
evolution that digital communication has had throughout the evolution of the species the other type of 146 
communication (analogical) would have disappeared, as a rule of the phylogenetic world. This being the case, 147 
it is very likely that, in regards to digital languages, rules of syntax (closer to analogical communication) 148 
would have emerged first than rules of semantics (Bateson, 1972, pp. 291-292). 149 
Now, what was found was that the languages of the analogical kind were also developed throughout 150 
evolution; art, in Bateson’s understanding, is an example of this occurrence.  151 
One of the most important lessons that Bateson has given us was the explanation to the reason why 152 
mammals possess such a developed analogical communication. It is not an objectal explanation (like we can 153 
consider digital communication to be at a simplistic level), but it refers to the relationships between us. It is so 154 
that we are able to feel distrust, for example, towards someone that verbally praises our behaviour in a given 155 
context. That is, the analogical metamessage frames our relationship with that person. All human (and 156 
mammal) analogical communication is then linked to emotions and feelings, be they of the kinaesthetic or 157 
paralinguistic kind, or iconic or even dreams. 158 
In human beings, the two types of communication interact amongst themselves a simultaneo and that 159 
interaction typically ensures some communicative normality. That is, those intervening in a system of a 160 
specific communicational level can understand grosso modo the messages that are exchanged between them, 161 
articulating the emotional dimension (unconscious) with the verbalised message, tapering one with the other 162 
(again, usually in an unconscious manner). Such an articulation could not happen in a pathologic situation. 163 
Bateson also notes that in humans it is easier to find communicational understanding at an analogical level 164 
than at the digital one, e.g., between people of very distinct cultures, indicating that at the phylogenetic level, 165 
analogic communication identifies more the species than digital. 166 
In regards to non-human animals –(3), as was mentioned, mammals possess analogic language and this is 167 
how they communicate, not about phenomena but rather the communication in itself (eg: sound) is the 168 
phenomena. This is emotional language. So, a dog that barks with a given intensity and sequence is not 169 
communicating something digitalised like ‘my owner arrived’, but rather ‘I am happy’, which is identified 170 
with that particular type of barking of that dog. Mammals can further associate objects and emotions, but 171 
always at a level of relationships; for example: a rabbit that sees a weapon in the hands of a human being runs 172 
because it associates that object to the negative emotions with other human beings holding the same object. 173 
A very important statement was that in analogic communication there is not the possibility to produce a 174 
message that is negative (‘no’), even if there is a possibility to produce a message that something is forbidden 175 
(‘don’t’) by aggressive behavior. This occurrence brings up very curious implications in regards to play, 176 
whether of animals of the same species (namely, small children that do not yet communicate verbally) or 177 
between species. Being only in an analogical scope, these communications seem to have messages of 178 
different/contradicting levels at the same time. For example, this can be seen in play fighting among animals 179 
(message: ‘this is playing’ and ‘this is fighting’, since there is no negative messages of the analogical kind). In 180 
verbal human humor, the same phenomenon seems to occur (Bateson, 1972, pp. 140-141). 181 
In the last years of his life, Bateson committed himself to the study of communication in the cetacea, with 182 
special emphasis in dolphins. He concluded that communication among the cetacea probably is based in 183 
differentiated languages from the human analogical and digital kind and from other hand mammals' 184 
languages. We also do not know how we learn to articulate the two dimensions of human communication. Nor 185 
do we know how we learn to communicate analogically, despite some works that were published in this 186 
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direction, as a consequence of Bateson’s studies on these matters (AAVV 1981; Fast, 1970). But we know 187 
that they are articulated at levels that guarantee intelligibility to the messages we exchange in a given context. 188 
In human digital messages, it is important that we talk/write about issues of the same logical type, of the 189 
same communicational level, either in the semantic or syntactic terms. Thus, even if we are talking about 190 
‘mind’ in this text, I cannot write it in Portuguese given the metacommunicative context in which the text is 191 
inserted. However, if I was describing let's say, dentures, in English, , I would hardly be communicating with 192 
the reader, since I would not be respecting the metacommunicative rule: ‘this text is about “mind”’. 193 
‘Mind’, in Bateson, not being a living being, is indeed a communicative instance, and it is exercised in the 194 
act of detecting increasingly abstract levels of communication, as was previous mentioned. 195 
This is rooted in one of the two basic principles of the Theory of Logical Types of Whitehead and Russell: 196 
if the members of the inferior logical type belong to a superior logical level (all the propositions of this piece 197 
fit in the superior logical level ‘text about “Mind”’), the reverse cannot occur, that is, ‘this text is about 198 
“Mind”’ is not a member of the propositions of the book; more simply put, a text cannot be a member of its 199 
sentences. 200 
Still in reference to a mental activity such as communication, based on the theory of logical types, Bateson 201 
mentions that whilst a more abstract communicative change dramatically influences all communicational 202 
levels below it. As previously mentioned, the possibility of a bottom-up change in the communicational 203 
hierarchy, whilst possible, does not possess the same capacity of change and it can only be observed at the 204 
populational level of the species on a grand scale. Furthermore, it takes time to occur, even if when it happens 205 
it spreads to all communicational levels of a system.  206 
Phylogenetic changes of both types of communication can lead either to self-regulation of the entire 207 
system (through feedback), with added complexity, or can lead to a runaway situation, in which the changes 208 
are of a nature that do not permit that the system self-regulates and self-organises, leading to a somewhat slow 209 
destruction of the entire mental-communicational system. This is the great danger in which we find ourselves 210 
by having deregulated the human world-environment mental system. 211 
In regards to 4) – dysfunction in human communication, Bateson detected two basic types of dysfunction: 212 
the one of people who are unable to identify the metacommunicative framework of the exchanged messages in 213 
the systems in which they are communicating and, in contrast, the one where people are not minimally 214 
focused in the messages that are being exchanged because they are obsessed with metacommunicational levels 215 
of any verbal proposition that is enunciated in a communicative system (‘what does this person mean by what 216 
he’s saying?’, is the question that is continuously made when listening to others’ speeches) (Bateson, 1972, p. 217 
199). 218 
Related to these two types of dysfunctions, Bateson created the expression double bind (DB), making an 219 
immense furthering in the understanding of the psychological and psychiatric pathologies.  220 
DB is a disruptive mental process that can lead to ontogenetic runaway if it is not corrected. It is 221 
characterised by: a) not identifying (consciously or unconsciously) metacommunicative levels of messages, 222 
thus refusing to contextualising them in the communicative level of the other participants in the system; b) not 223 
understanding the meaning of a message, due to the fact that it is in contradiction with the meaning of the 224 
metamessage; for example, we have a person that is analogically despised by a relative, for example, a father, 225 
that continuously tells her ‘I love you’. The person that does not understand that she is caught between two 226 
different levels of communication tries to act in a way that the two messages, lived by the person at the same 227 
level, are accomplished. Since this is not possible, the person is continuously punished, since her acts will 228 
always be penalised by one of the levels of communication.  229 
However, the person can be aware that she is dealing with different communicative levels, pretending to 230 
change the metacommunicative frame by the communicative. In this case, wanting to change to proposition ‘I 231 
love you’ in the communicative frame of that human relationship. Since this is impossible, the person is also 232 
going to be continuously punished by analogical acts that contradict her (pathological) comprehension of the 233 
metamessage. Her tendency will be not to change their comprehension of the metamessage, reinforcing  it 234 
digitally (‘he loves me, but does not know how to express his love’, for example), which will lead to organic 235 
runaway, where the psychological dimension is included. 236 
Is it possible to leave a DB through feedback and self-regulate it in meta-communicative terms? 237 
 238 
 239 
3  ‘Mind’ as a way of learning 240 
 241 
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According to Bateson, there are several levels of learning distinguished by their increasing levels of 242 
abstraction. These levels are based on the theory of logical types, mentioned above. The principles of this 243 
theory are three: 244 
1 – There is a logic discontinuity between a class and its members, as was explained previously; 245 
2 – Following from 1, a class cannot be a member of itself, nor one of its members can be the class of 246 
which it belongs (also previously mentioned). This is especially important in reasoning in which one takes a 247 
part for the whole. This logical procedure has serious epistemological connotations when applied to living 248 
beings. 249 
3 – There is an ego function; humans usually distinguish tones of communication inside themselves, e.g., 250 
as in inner conversations, or in thoughts, as well as messages that they exchange with other people (and even 251 
with non-human animals). Deficiencies in the ego function entail psychological or psychiatric problems. 252 
Taking into account these epistemological premises of his thought, Bateson established the lowest level, 253 
i.e., that with the least abstraction of learning, level zero (0). It is characterised by the same, or perhaps with 254 
minor levels of variation, response of an animal to external sensory stimuli. Some examples include: situations 255 
in which the response to the stimulus is highly determined by genetic factors, like walking, and situations in 256 
which learning in response to a disturbing stimulus leads to the response being ‘automated’.  257 
It is from the inside out
4
. It is possible to obtain a high level of complexity in learning, but the variety of 258 
responses to the stimuli-messages ("[…] 'learning' is a communicational phenomenon"; Bateson, 1972, p. 279) 259 
is always finite. 260 
In level 1 of learning, animals give varied response-messages in different moments, even if the range of 261 
alternatives is the same in time 1, time 2 and time 3. What happens then is that the animal learns that there is 262 
more that one type of possible response-messages, which cannot happen at the level zero of learning. The 263 
most famous case is 'the dog of Pavlov’ that learns to salivate in response to a stimulus to which he did not 264 
salivate before learning it. Beyond keeping the unconditioned reflex of salivating as a response to food (T1), 265 
he learned to salivate in response to a neutral conditioning stimulus ( a buzzer - T3) after he went through an 266 
intermediary stage in which he was simultaneously exposed (T2) to a unconditioned (food) and conditioned 267 
(buzzer) stimulus to which he responded in an unconditioned manner by salivating. The context of his 268 
learning was changed, enlarged: "we may regard 'context' as a collective term for all those events which tell 269 
the organism among what set of alternative he must make his next choice" (Bateson, 1972, p. 289). What 270 
happens in level 1 learning is that we abductively transfer it to other contexts, that is, when facing different 271 
contexts (for an observer), we are going to evaluate the messages-stimuli as being of the same logical level 272 
and transpose our set of alternatives to that other context, adapting them to this other context
5
. 273 
Usually, this transfer in learning occurs due to context markers, the buzzer in the case of Pavlov’s dog; 274 
another very typical example is etiquette.  275 
It is worth noting that many human context markers are of nonverbal nature, like in nonhuman animals. 276 
Experimental psychology is still dedicated to study the phenomena of human learning that occurs only at this 277 
level (level 1). One of the challenges is to change/induce context markers in their clients, so as to cure them of 278 
psycopathies, such like phobias. We usually do not detect our context markers, and even if we do, we can 279 
hardly tell why they have this function in our rote learning, which is the basis of abductive inferences
6
. 280 
However, we can without a doubt detect context markers in our behaviour and in others’ even though we do 281 
not know why, nor how, these markers act. This detection occurs by the identification of (self-) observed 282 
behavioural changes. 283 
People that are able to identify this marker in other people can be excellent managers and psychologists for 284 
instance, but can also be manipulative and dangerous. 285 
                                                          
4
 "[…] Genetic components might determine skill in learning to be transcontextual or (more abstractly) the potentialities 
for acquiring this skill. Or, conversely, the genome might determine skills in resisting transcontextual pathways, or the 
potentiality for acquiring this latter skill. (Geneticists have paid very little attention to the necessity of defining the logical 
typing of messages carried by DNA)" (Bateson, 1972, p. 273).  
5
 "Whatever the system, adaptive change depends upon feedback loops, be it those provided by natural selection or those 
of individual reinforcement. In all cases, then, there must be a process of trial and error and a mechanism of comparison. 
[…]In other words, we (organisms) learn to learn, or in the more technical phrase we deutero-learn" (Bateson, 1972, p. 
288). 
6
 "There is the phenomenon of rote learning, in which an item in the behavior of the organism becomes a stimulus for 
another item of behavior" (Bateson, 1972, p. 288). 
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Before proceeding to other hierarchical levels of learning, we should note these two points: 1- the 286 
processes of learning do not occur only when we are children, nor only when we are inserted in formal 287 
learning systems (e.g.: school); these occur throughout our lives, independently of our chronological age and 288 
even of our stage of organic debility; 2 – The continual use of the same type of context marker leads to the 289 
point where that way of punctuating reality becomes a non-conscious habit of metacommunicative type, that 290 
is: we begin to construct reality and make our choices within the frame of this metacommunicative context 291 
which has turned into an unconscious premise, a mental habit.  292 
"The contexts have communicational reality only insofar as they are effective as messages, i.e., 293 
insofar as they are represented or reflected (correctly or with distortion) in multiple parts of the 294 
communicational system which we are studying; and this system is not the physical individual 295 
but a wide network of pathways of messages. Some of these pathways happen to be located 296 
outside the physical individual, others inside; but the characteristics of the system are in no way 297 
dependent upon any boundary lines which we may superpose upon the communicational map. It 298 
is not communicationally meaningful to ask whether the blind man’s stick or the scientist’s 299 
microscope are “parts” of the man who uses them" (Bateson, 1972, p. 251). 300 
Learning 2 occurs when an animal reviews the set of alternatives that until then he considered possible to 301 
choose in given contexts. Even though this happens more frequently in human beings, it can also be verified 302 
in other mammals. By broadening the set of possible alternatives, we act in a manner different than usual 303 
when facing the same context; this mainly happens in reversal learning; for example: when we want to train a 304 
puppy to not urinate in the house, we use a punitive context marker, usually a newspaper. Thus, when a dog 305 
urinates inside the house it is punished with the sound of a folded newspaper close to his ears as a way of 306 
threatening him (or even by beating his body with the newspaper). We say ‘no’ in an assertive manner so to 307 
habituate the animal from refraining acting thus within the confines of the house, while reinforcing the context 308 
marker newspaper-sound of disapproval. After, we take the animal outside the house to where he can do so 309 
with impunity. We take the dog from a unconditioned reflex to a conditioned one, associating urine with going 310 
outside without being punished. It is henceforth hoped that the dog will show signs of wishing to go outside 311 
when he wants to urinate. 312 
Now, the animal can change its set of alternatives and by doing so he changes ours as well in this context: 313 
a Schnauzer I had a few years ago learned to reverse his learning: every time he wanted to go for a walk he 314 
urinated so that I had to make the threat (which he understood to be nothing more than a threat) and we 315 
proceeded to walk; he urinated the rest and I was happy. I only understood that he was training me when his 316 
strategy was repetitive throughout the day and I saw his expression of happiness when I reprimanded him with 317 
the newspaper! He had changed his choices, and I had to change mine in that communicative context in which 318 
we were inserted! The change thus occurred at level 2, since we had to establish new metacommunicative 319 
rules about that context. 320 
Based on his collaboration with psychiatrists and psychologists, Bateson suggested that ‘the traces of 321 
personality’ fit with learning 2 (as well as the phenomena of ‘transference’), largely the result of people's 322 
communication with something/someone in given types of contexts. " No man is 'resourceful' or 'dependent' or 323 
'fatalistic' in a vacuum. His characteristic, whatever it be, is not his but is rather a characteristic of what goes 324 
on between him and something (or somebody) else" (Bateson, 1972, p. 298). 325 
In regards to learning 3, following the Theory of Logical Types, there is a corrective change in the set of 326 
alternative of choice-action against a given context. In fact, this level is that which psychotherapists and 327 
psychiatrists wish their clients to reach, since it would imply a change in ‘personality traits’, that is: the person 328 
would start to punctuate reality in a different manner than the one it had non-consciously acquired. According 329 
to Bateson, this is very hard to achieve in human beings but he considers that there are situations in which 330 
however they effectively can occur: 331 
1- Replacing, through mainly digitalised indications, the premises of learning II, after its identification. 332 
Bateson considers that this is what usually happens in psychotherapeutic levels. Premises' identification and 333 
steps' orientation for behavioural changes when facing given contexts are determined by the psychotherapist. 334 
But is this a real passage of a level of learning, or merely obedience to someone in whom we trust as 335 
exemplifying what is best for us? If behavioural change occurs in this scope, the identity of the person could 336 
be in jeopardy, his perception of himself could be confronted with what he wants to be, and what he continues 337 
to be. Then, this can lead to a profound double bind situation and so, to pathogenesis. 338 
2 – There are situations in which this change of patternized axioms of behaviour occurs due to internal 339 
working of the person within herself and there we find a genuine learning 3 level. In it, people change their 340 
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fundamental beliefs, their way of punctuation of reality, but – because of this – if the process is abrupt, one 341 
can enter a process of madness, of loss of identity. At a psychotherapeutic level, is it not possible for this to 342 
occur? Well, I believe that it is, if the role of the therapist is more of a learning facilitator than of a paternalist 343 
schoolmaster. "It is claimed that something of the sort does from time to time occur in psychotherapy, 344 
religious conversation, an in other sequences in which there is profound reorganisation of character. Zen 345 
Buddhists, Occidental mystics, and some psychiatrists assert that these matters are totally beyond the reach of 346 
language" (Bateson, 1972, pp. 301-302). 347 
Learning 3 is said to be beyond digitalised language because it is verifiable at an organic and corporal 348 
level, in all facets of the person, and that is why it is hard to talk about them; they are easier to be shown than 349 
to be talked about. The tradition inherent in the training of Buddhist monks is based on the premise that 350 
learning, the more transformative it is, the more unspeakable it becomes.  351 
Thus, it happens in a non-conscious manner and it is usually verified only after it has occurred, by change 352 
of action. 353 
Before proceeding, let us remind ourselves of two points previously highlighted: 354 
1- The existence of rote learning: this means that an organism's given behaviour contaminates other 355 
behaviours of the same organism. Therefore, if a behavioural change of the organism occurs due to a different 356 
classification/punctuation of reality (than the patterned one), this implies changes in the organism as a whole, 357 
in the phenomena of the same communicative level. 358 
2- Changes in the highest levels of communicative abstractions determine all the levels of learning that 359 
underpin them (Bateson, 1972, p. 247). 360 
This way, when a person reaches a mental level corresponding to learning 3 , the premises of this level will 361 
spread, changing the whole of the organism’s perspective. Following Bateson’s reasoning, this includes level 362 
zero (to which he points as limits, to that kind of changes, genetic factors, mainly of the phylogenetic kind
7
).  363 
Now, if we multiply these two factors in the life of an organism, it is easily understood that its capacity to 364 
self-regulate is hard, especially if the higher mental level was quickly reached (like in abrupt religious 365 
conversion, temporally speaking).  366 
The possibility of the organisms not be able to self-organise is very high, potentially originating a runaway 367 
process, which can cause the annulment of the perception of the ‘self’. Thus, the pathogenic danger of this 368 
learning level.  369 
"[…] Level III can be dangerous, and some fall by the wayside. These are often labeled by 370 
psychiatry as psychotic, and many of them find themselves inhibited from using the first person 371 
pronoun. For others, more successful, the resolution of the contraries may be a collapsing of 372 
much that was learned at level II, revealing a simplicity in which hunger leads directly to eating, 373 
and the identified self is no longer in charge of organizing the behavior. These are the 374 
incorruptible innocents of the world" (Bateson, 1972, pp. 305-306).  375 
As was previously pointed out, not everyone arrives to the third level of learning, and there seems to exist 376 
a sine qua non condition: the existence of double bind at level 2: it implies intense suffering at the second 377 
level. Without suffering, this possibility is not brought up
8
. "[...] The creature is driven to level III by 378 
'contraries' generated at level II, then we may expect that it is the resolving of these contraries that will 379 
constitute positive reinforcement at level III" (Bateson, 1972, p. 305).  380 
Bateson considered the possibility of existence of a more abstract and formal level, this would be learning 381 
4: "Learning IV would be change in Learning III, but probably does not occur in any adult living organism on 382 
this earth. Evolutionary process has, however, created organisms whose ontogeny brings them to Level III. 383 
The combination of phylogenesis with ontogenesis, in fact, achieves Level IV" (Bateson, 1972, p. 293).  384 
In Bateson’s texts to which I have had access, he indicates that maybe this level is related to art, but falls 385 
away from the scope of mental hierarchy based on the theory of the logical type; the reader will find in this 386 
article a reflection about the importance of art, of the mystic and of the sacred in the thought of this author. 387 
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 "There is needed not only that first-order change which suits the immediate environmental (or physiological) demand 
but also second-order changes which will reduce the amount of trial and error needed to achieve the first-order change. 
And so on. By superposing and interconnecting many feedback loops, we (and all other biological systems) not only 
solve particular problems but also form habits which we apply to the solution of classes of problems" (Bateson, 1972, p. 
274) 
8
 However, we can’t infer that everyone in double bind at level 2 reaches level 3. 
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However, in other texts he points towards ‘mentation’ (Harries-Jones, 1995), which would be a type of 388 
biological organizer of evolution, namely of our species. I am doubtful whether this is what he meant by level 389 
4. I recommend reading Appendix B of the work by Harries-Jones (1995) about this specificity of Bateson’s 390 
thought
9
.  391 
To finalize this point concerning mind and learning, I have to briefly refer to Bateson’s strong criticism of 392 
formal learning in a school setting, from kindergarten to universities. The main points approached critically by 393 
Bateson are the following: the generalized non-understanding that signs do not bear meanings without 394 
communicative contexts, in which a set of signs refer to each other; the total absence of learning about the 395 
mental connection among all living beings; the lack of attention given to kinesthetic and paralinguistic 396 
communication in teaching languages; and the encouragement of academic institutions' administrators to 397 
adopt quantitative criteria in evaluating students as well as teachers. (Bateson, 1979, introduction and chapter 398 
1; Bateson, 1972, metalogues 2 and 5). 399 
 400 
 401 
4  Ontological criteria
10
 of a mind 402 
 403 
As stated above, it is clear that the mind is not a thing
11
, but rather of procedural nature, allowing living beings 404 
to reach the highest levels of metacommunicative abstraction within onto, phylo and genetic limits. Mind acts 405 
at the intraorganic level (for instance, establishing connections between several organs). This makes it 406 
possible to speak of an organic cognition by contrasting it with the classic concept of cognition in psychology 407 
which generally encompasses only the one obtained by quantifiable tests of deductive capacity (and 408 
eventually inductive), expressing resolutions to mathematical and linguistic's problems. For this thinker, the 409 
characterisation of living beings should not be done through quantifiable variables, but by shapes, forms and 410 
relations (Bateson, 1979, pp. 146-149). 411 
In this section we will approach some important questions, namely: a) do mental processes only occur in 412 
individual living systems (and do they even exist, as individuals)?; b) Are there mental systems in non-living 413 
beings? If so, what characteristics do they possess? What distinguishes them from mental living systems?; c) 414 
Is there a dimension of mental performance that is related to the articulation between ontogeny (learning) and 415 
phylogeny (evolution)? How can it be verified? What characteristics does it possess? 416 
We will answer to these questions in an integrated manner. 417 
A mental process possesses some characteristics, all of them necessary; its natural basis is connection and 418 
its performance is purely relational. These characteristics are: 419 
1. The mind is immanent in the universe, and not something that is transcendent in relation to it. Bateson 420 
believes that the mind does not possess a personal statute. It is neither constituted as a person, nor human, nor 421 
divine. He considers the conjecture of Occam’s Law to be the best argument in favour of this. It affirms, 422 
grosso modo, that when facing more than one hypotheses to explain the same phenomenon, and there not 423 
being conclusive demonstration about any of them, the simplest should be accepted. "The network is not 424 
bounded by the skin but includes all external pathways along which information can travel. It also includes 425 
those effective differences which are immanent in the “objects” of such information. It includes the pathways 426 
                                                          
9
 " The model discussed in this paper assumes, tacitly, that the logical types can be ordered in the form of a simple, 
unbranching ladder. I believe that it was wise to deal first with the problems raised by such a simple model. But the 
world of action, experience, organization, and learning cannot be completely mapped onto a model which excludes 
propositions about the relation between classes of different logical type.  If C
1 
is a class of propositions, and C
2 
is a class 
of propositions about the members of C
1
; C
3 
then being a class of propositions about the members of C
2
; how then shall 
we classify propositions about the relation between these classes? [...] It follows that a next task will be to look for 
examples of learning which cannot be classified in terms of my hierarchy of learning but which fall to the side of this 
hierarchy as learning about the relation between steps of the hierarchy" (Bateson, 1972, pp. 307-308). The reader should 
compare this extract with Bateson’s mental activity, describe in point 1 of this paper. 
10
 "Philosophers have recognised and separated two sorts of problems. There are first the problems of how things are, 
what is a person, and what world is this. These are the problems of ontology" (Bateson, 1972, p. 313). 
11
 The Introduction of Mind and Nature (1979) is one the best condensed examples of mind's relational dimension. The 
reader should note that in this work the concept of ‘mind’ is gradually replaced by ‘pattern which connects’. According 
to Bateson, the most important scientific advance of the 20
th
 century regarded the understanding of mind, even if he 
considered it to be yet very incomplete: Bateson, 1972, p. 487.  
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of sound and light along which travel transforms of differences originally immanent in things and other people 427 
—and especially in our own actions" (Bateson, 1972, p. 319). 428 
2. Despite being immanent it is not materialisable in its substance, even if it may become embodied in its 429 
already mentioned intra-organic aspect; 430 
3. Mind acts through differentiation, or differentiation of differentiation, according to the level of 431 
abstraction we are dealing with, against redundancies. Ideas are some of these differentiating mechanisms; 432 
they act contextually and thus are immanent. Articulation of ideas among themselves produce patterns and 433 
metapatterns. 434 
4. Minds are self-regulating, self-correcting systems in search of an equilibrium between differentiating 435 
and redundant processes within a system, and systems to each other. In regards to living systems, this self-436 
regulating capacity is called homeostasis, or self-organizing
12
. 437 
"That is because people are self-corrective systems. They are self-corrective against disturbance, 438 
and if the obvious is not of a kind that they can easily assimilate without internal disturbance, 439 
their self-corrective mechanisms work to sidetrack it, to hide it, even to the extent of shutting the 440 
eyes if necessary, or shutting off various parts of the process of perception. Disturbing 441 
information can be framed like a pearl so that it doesn’t make a nuisance of itself; and this will be 442 
done, according to the understanding of the system itself of what would be a nuisance. This too—443 
the premise regarding what would cause disturbance—is something which is learned and then 444 
becomes perpetuated or conserved" (Bateson, 1972, p. 435).  445 
5. Mental self-regulation works by feedback loops
13
 (conservative variable) that regulate random factors 446 
(creative variable) of a system. This is the basic functioning of what is called ‘stochastic processes’ in 447 
epistemology, and all the mental activity connects itself in this manner. Mental systems without feedback 448 
loops would not be systems, i.e., would not have an interconnected and hieararchised organisation, at least 449 
horizontally. But systems without random interaction do not evolve, so they cannot be living systems. They 450 
are systems in perfect thermodynamic equilibrium
14
. "It is a general assumption of this book that both genetic 451 
change and the process called learning (including the somatic changes induced by habit and environment) are 452 
stochastic processes" (Bateson, 1979, p. 163). 453 
This should be highlighted: Bateson holds that there are no ‘pure’ information entries, no inputs in virgin 454 
organisms. The conservative branch of the system (its communicative pattern, depending on the level of 455 
learning that it is) selects disturbances and from them an idea immediately emerges, a difference
15
, an organic 456 
perception. It is with these ideas that the organism enters in a homeostatic, self-correcting process. "[…] 457 
When the differences enter my body by triggering an end organ, this type of travel is replaced by travel which 458 
is energized at every step by the metabolic energy latent in the protoplasm which receives the difference, 459 
recreates or transforms it, and passes it on" (Bateson, 1972, p. 459). 460 
If it can’t do this, the system becomes unregulated and may become ill (if it is a living one) and even in 461 
runaway, dissolving itself as a system
16
.  462 
                                                          
12
 Homeostasis and self-organisation are not exactly synonyms, but this should not deter the reader from the question at 
hand. 
13
 "The system shall consist of closed loops or networks of pathways along which differences and transforms of 
differences shall be transmitted. (What is transmitted on a neuron is not an impulse, it is news of a difference)" (Bateson, 
1972, p. 490). 
14
 What is opposed to equilibrium (potentially thermodynamic petrified) is epigenesis, in living beings. Conrad 
Waddington created this concept, which helped to clarify Bateson’s thinking. 
15
 "What gets onto the map, in fact, is difference, be it a difference in altitude, a difference in vegetation, a difference in 
population structure, difference in surface, or what-ever. Differences are the things that get onto a map.  But what is a 
difference? A difference is a very peculiar and obscure concept. It is certainly not a thing or an event. […] A difference, 
then, is an abstract matter" (Bateson, 1972, pp. 457-458)  
16
 "Each system contains subsystems which are potentially regenerative, i.e., which would go into exponential ‘runaway’ 
if uncorrected. (Examples of such regenerative components are Malthusian characteristics of population, schismogenic 
changes of personal interaction, armaments races, etc.) The regenerative potentialities of such subsystems are typically 
kept in check by various sorts of governing loops to achieve “steady state.” Such systems are ‘conservative’ in the sense 
that they tend to conserve the truth of propositions about the values of their component variables—especially they 
conserve the values of those variables which otherwise would show exponential change. Such systems are homeostatic, 
i.e., the effects of small changes of input will be negated and the steady state maintained by reversible adjustment" 
(Bateson, 1972, p. 447). 
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Mental processes adress a difference to other, and the more enlarged, and simultaneously rigorous, this 463 
interconnection's understanding is, the more truthful it is. "The mental world – the mind – the world of 464 
information processing – is not limited to the skin" (Bateson, 1972, p. 46). 465 
In Bateson’s thought, the part is in the whole, and the whole is in the parts; however, the whole is never 466 
equal to the sum of the parts.
17
.  467 
6. Mind works through trial and error, seeking the maintenance of its homeostasis: "The unit which shows 468 
the characteristic of trial and error will be legitimately called a mental system" (Bateson, 1972, p. 465). 469 
7. All minds incorporate in themselves their ontogeny's punctuation, as well as their species' histories (at 470 
least).  471 
This is the reason why transference (technical term used in psychiatry and psychotherapy) happens in any 472 
mental living form. Transference functions by attributing meaning that we attributed to relationships with 473 
other mental systems; we abductively carry this pattern to our relationships with mental systems that we 474 
consider to possess the same logical type of relationship as the previous ones. "[…] After all, the shape of 475 
what happened between you and me yesterday carries over to shape how we respond to each other today. And 476 
that shaping is, in principle a transference" (Bateson, 1979, pp. 15-16). 477 
8. Bateson considers that that which modern science called the laws of nature is mental determinism. He is 478 
very skeptical in regards to their detection in the living world, mainly for two reasons: 1 - in it, mental activity 479 
is very complex, with various states of interaction between organism-medium; 2 – the organisms live in 480 
continual mental construction among themselves (Bateson, 1972, p. 472). 481 
Given the characteristics identified to guarantee a mental existence, can we state that a computer is a 482 
mental system? Yes and no! In fact, in a computer we can identify the previous characteristics, but it cannot 483 
execute them by itself, autonomously; it executed them because someone programmed it do so; thus it is a 484 
mental system as a composite unit of computer-human; the computer's internal mental connections are of a 485 
lower level of abstraction than the ones that constituted the co-connection computer-human. 486 
 487 
 488 
5  In reverse: 'Mind' as host 489 
We mainly approached Mind from an inductive point of view, 
18
 as Bateson would say. What is meant by 490 
this is that Mind was considered beginning from a subsystem and proceeding to broader systems. It was also 491 
important to understand that mental functioning can take place in intra-organisms. This kind of cognition is 492 
actually primary and potentially integrative of racional cognition, producing logical inferences of inductive 493 
and deductive types. These two types of mental activity (organical and rational) imply connections with living 494 
systems, constituting composite units, even if they are considered as separated in the eyes of an observer. 495 
But we could consider mental activity in a bottom-up universe, that is, of the enlargened systems to the 496 
systems of less mental activity. The problem is knowing what we place on top and at the end of this chain. 497 
Throughout his several works, Bateson calls our attention to the inversion of the the chain of being carried 498 
forth by Lamarck, whom he considered to have created a paradigmatic revolution in science. In effect, if until 499 
Lamarck, Mind was on top of the chain of being and at the end were the more elementary living beings, with 500 
Lamarck (first evolutionist theory's author) the chain was inverted (Bateson, 1972, p. 433). However, I would 501 
say that Bateson introduces a third vision of the chain of being in which both hierarchies exist simultaneously. 502 
If, as individual systems (or rather, as composite units), we can reach enlargened mental levels, it is 503 
because Mind was already performing at these larger levels; on the other hand, Mind exists and sustains itself 504 
exactly by the existence of lesser levels that underlie it (if we look at the chain of being from the bottom-up).  505 
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 "Thus, in no system which shows mental characteristics can any part have unilateral control over the whole. In other 
words, the mental characteristics of the system are immanent, not in some part, but in the system as a whole" (Bateson, 
1972, p. 317)  
18
 "It should also be noted that the structure of this essay is inductive in the sense that the hierarchy of orders of learning 
is presented to the reader from the bottom upward, from level zero to level III. But it is not intended that the explanations 
of the phenomenal world which the model affords shall be unidirectional. In explaining the model to the reader, a 
unidirectional approach was necessary, but within the model it is assumed that higher levels are explanatory of lower 
levels and vice versa. It is also assumed that a similar reflexive relation—both inductive and deductive—obtains among 
ideas and items of learning as these exist in the lives of the creatures which we study" (Bateson, 1972, p. 308). 
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Throughout time, Mind (of the top of hierarchy of being) has been definied as supreme, usually in 506 
transcendent manner to the universe, many times as being God ( and, in some cultures, gods without/with a 507 
superior God). 508 
Now, in my understanding, in Bateson’s work, Mind becomes close to that associate with Buddhism. The 509 
fact that he died in a Zen monestary cannot be without significance (however, I am not aware of texts by 510 
Bateson that indicate towards a belief in re-incarnation
19
).  511 
If previously we approached the ontological characteristics of the mind in lesser levels, we now point 512 
toward what the author indicated to be the characteristics of Mind seen in reverse. It is worth noting that 513 
Bateson thought it possible there to be learning levels beyond level 3 in the universe. In these superior levels 514 
we would have more precise access to this question, that here we can only touch upon. 515 
Understood in this light, Mind is a no-thing, immanent like water infiltrates every inch of each and all 516 
living beings, and is quite beyond of the physical limits (skin) of living beings (Bateson, 1972, p. 318). They 517 
continuously dwell in it.  518 
We are talking of some (no)thing processual, not static, immanent, and that is not apprehended by human 519 
mental states (Bateson, 1979: chapters VII and VIII, especially). This is due to the almost inevitable dualist 520 
form in which we perceive the universe, even when we hold to integrated, systemic and holistic (we refer to 521 
epistemological holism: cfr. Quine, 1969 and Rorty, 1979, among others) theories. This difficulty also means 522 
that we have to communicate about something in which we are immersed, and that constitutes, per se, an 523 
ontological problem of the mind (cfr. Bateson, 1972, p. 512). "I cannot know whether it is ultimately a 524 
tautology neither how many levels it has. I am inside it and therefore cannot know its outer limits - if it has 525 
any" (Bateson, 1979, pp. 228-229). 526 
The transcendent status of Aquinas', or Aristotle's, Supreme Mind (Bateson, 1972, p. 493) positioned it in a 527 
platform of such superiority that what happened to what it created and coordinated did not affect it in any 528 
way. Now, Mind, in Bateson, can be contaminated by the errors of the lower levels, even if this may take 529 
longer. Thus the importance of this author as a pioneer to ecological movement.   530 
In many of his texts, Bateson accepts (even though he does not totally agree) that Mind can be taken as 531 
God; for him, belief in a higher power is, as a basis, an open door to the understanding of the power of Mind.  532 
The immersion of Mind beyond level 3 in human beings sometimes occurs in incidents of great suffering, 533 
when our inner disolution reaches such a point where our perception of ourselves, our notion of self 534 
vanishes
20
. An enormous humility can come about in these moments  and this allows us to give away our inner 535 
confusion, our mental desegragation (at the level we are) to a wider mental level. This giving away, this trust 536 
in a superior Mind (like it happens in Alcoholics Anonymous: Bateson, 1972, pp. 328-329) usually carries 537 
with it a joy and profound inner peace as we feel submerged in something superior. It gives purpose to life, 538 
some may call it Love, that supports/nourishes in the most terrible moments of people's lives those who give 539 
themselves to something beyond the comprehension of human rationality. Giving away our ‘self’ becomes 540 
less important than feeling the immense dignity of being welcomed in this Mind. "[...] Anonymity is also a 541 
profound statement of the systemic relation, part-to-whole" (Bateson, 1972, p. 334). 542 
As the passage of level 2 to level 3 in human beings can only be possible through DB (thus, suffering) at 543 
level 2, also an immersion in mental states that welcome us (top-bottom movement in the chain of being), can 544 
only be possible to occur (and does not always occur) in a situation of great suffering and humility. "If we 545 
deeply and even unconsciously believe that our relation to the largest system which concerns us—the 'Power 546 
greater than self'—is symmetrical and emulative, then we are in error" (Bateson, 1972, p. 336). 547 
At this level it would perhaps be more accurate to speak of wisdom instead of knowledge and Bateson 548 
emphasises that the lack of this systemic wisdom is certainly punitive in all mental level that underly it, 549 
including human beings. 550 
 551 
 552 
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 He believed in the evolution and permanence of ideas in the universe: ‘The ideas which seemed to be me can also be 
immanent in you. May they survive if true’ (Bateson, 1972, p. 471). 
20
 "Suffering is a state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the integrity (intactness) of a person. […] 
Suffering requires consciousness of the self, involves the emotions, has effects on the persons social relationships, and 
has an impact on the body" (Cassell, 2004, pp. 32 and 224).  
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6  Art, mysticism and aesthetics
21
 553 
 554 
Bateson considered that his explanatory model of learning levels had limitations: one of them regarded the 555 
fact that it omits the possiblity of interaction between levels of learning in a discontinued fashion, for 556 
example: from level 1 to level 3. 557 
Another limitation that he found in his hierachised system of learning, i.e., communication, refers to the 558 
types of mental communication, i.e., learning, that some human activities provide, such as those provided by 559 
art, mysticism and love. 560 
Even though Bateson distinguished between art and poetry, we will consider these two communicational 561 
types as one, thus considering that poetry is a form of art. 562 
According to Bateson, the artist is someone who, in principle, has to go out from his self and communicate 563 
mainly analogically and emotionally with other systems. Artistic language is of a different communication 564 
level than that of science since it captures mental interactions of another level (cfr. Bateson, 1972, metalogue 565 
6). 566 
The nature of art is profoundly subjective, even though it establishes broaden mental connections of 567 
cybernetic kind. The artist has to feel as if he were part of a network, to which he belongs as a member; but it 568 
also envelopes him and inside it he is simultaneously differentiated from other members of the network..  569 
This happens because it is a network, self-correcting itself (given the entire network) in each (and all) 570 
level(s) of communication of the envolved organisms.  571 
Therefore, artistic manifestations, being so profoundly enlarging and connecting, from a mental 572 
perspective, are also extraordinarily subjective, impossible to quantify since being fluid, continual, recursive 573 
and self-correcting (in each member, and inside of the system), not allowing itself to be caught in the dualist 574 
thinking that creates sections. "Cybernetically speaking, ‘my’ relation to any larger system around me and 575 
including other things and persons will be different from ‘your’ relation to some similar system around you. 576 
The relation ‘part of’ must necessarily and logically always be complementary but the meaning of the phrase 577 
“part of” will be different for every person. This difference will 'power' must necessarily appear different from 578 
where each person sits" (Bateson, 1972, p. 332). The mental capacity of the artist is typically abductive, 579 
creating ideas, differences of differences (ideas), mixing that which at the logical-intellectual level cannot be 580 
mixed, like in the case of poetry, which is usually metaphoric, that is, literally carrying
22
, in this case, the 581 
meaning from a context to another. 582 
However, Bateson warns that he should not be interpreted as someone who favours a type of 583 
individual/collective emotional development, against logical-intellectual cognition. This is typical of who 584 
behaves in a dualistic logic, something that he is not at all (Bateson, 1972, p. 468).  585 
Furthermore, love, by itself, is stated by Bateson as a priveledged communicational path with Mind, since 586 
implying a decentralisation of the self, and the focus on others, that is, it is systemic at its core. Love is 587 
characterised also by vinculating our identity to the existence of others, in a recursive interconnectivity of a 588 
deep level. "Finally, it is appropriate to mention some of the factors which may act as correctives—areas of 589 
human action which are not limited by the narrow distortions of coupling through conscious purpose and 590 
where wisdom can obtain. (a) Of these, undoubtedly the most important is love" (Bateson, 1972, p. 452).  591 
The intimate relationship between humans and other animals (like domestic ones) or with other 592 
beings/energies in nature can be included in love, which allows for an expanded wisdom far beyond individual 593 
corporal dimensions. 594 
The more intimate the intersystemic mental connections people reach (or in which they let themselves 595 
submerge) the bigger the aesthetic sensibility, that is, their ability to detect patterns and metapatterns which 596 
connect. An example is provided by Bateson himself founding a metapattern between homonomy and 597 
homology, or between species, or even between all living beings (Harries-Jones, 1995).  598 
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 Studying these themes and their relation with Bateson’s thinking in depth would demand a close examination of Angels 
Fear which will not be done here. 
22
 In Greek, metaphor means to carry.  
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In this sense, an ecology of mind corresponds to an aesthetical understanding of the universe
23
; thus it can 599 
be understood that, even though Bateson found interest in some environmental ecological lienages, he did not 600 
totally identify himself with them (Harries-Jones, 1995, p. 171). 601 
 602 
 603 
7  Epistemology and ecology of mind 604 
 605 
During a period of his life, Bateson considered that all areas that investigate the living world should belong to 606 
the science of communication. Later, he named this unifying science ‘ecology of mind’ which he thought 607 
could be identified with epistemology
24
: "Perhaps 'epistemology' is only another word for the study of the 608 
ecology of mind" (Bateson, 1972, p. 401). One of the functions of philosophical epistemology being the 609 
formal interrelation between the various sciences, we can easily see the identification stated by Bateson. 610 
The deep link between epistemology and ecology of mind is also related with the fact that this science 611 
constitutes, in essence, a new paradigm 1- in its procedures to explain communicative phenomena; 2- in 612 
reflecting on its own explanatory principles and adopted methodology. 613 
The main characteristics of an ecology of mind are of an epistemological nature; we will briefly present 614 
them, contrasting them with the mechanistic newtonian paradigm. 615 
1. Starting with the conceptual influences, ecology of mind is founded mainly in cybernetics, in theory of 616 
systems, in theory of information, in von Neummann’s games' theory, assuming as well some interest in 617 
Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis. Newtonian paradigm is rooted in the Greek dualist tradition. It is worth 618 
noting that Bateson was aware that, in the future, the theories that had once influenced him could take less 619 
interesting paths and could even in turn become dangerous (Bateson, 1972, p. 456; p. 484). 620 
2. Ecology of mind assumes the observer’s position as a subject involved in the scientific practice 621 
(Bateson, 1972, pp. 462-463). The observer does not exist tout court in the Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm. 622 
3. The subjective dimension (in the sense that was previously mentioned) of the studied phenomena, in 623 
each of its levels, invalidates an ecology of mind of quantitative nature. Such could makes us believe less in 624 
the scientificity of the results, but only to those who seek to study the living world (including human) fixed to 625 
the Newtonian physics paradigm (itself outdated, in theory, in practice and methodology – for example, the 626 
probablistics of contemporary Physics). This attraction for the modern mechanicism sometimes places 627 
scientists of the living (e.g.: biologists, doctors and social scientists) in communication conflict with what is 628 
their study object: living beings, including humans.  629 
The scientific methodology of the Ecology of Mind is based on patterns, in abductive regularities (Bateson, 630 
1972, p. 413) of the digital and analogic kind, as well as in the inductive and deductive inferences, as 631 
previously stated. 632 
4. The linear causality of the Newtonian paradigm is opposed to conceptions of multiple, circular and self-633 
correcting ‘causalities’ of optimising type (that is, with minimum and maximum limits). Like Hoffmeyer 634 
(AAVV, 2008, pp. 44-45), I believe that Bateson's thought refers to a final causality, removed from episteme 635 
(except in philosophy) since the emergence of Newtonian scientia . 636 
5. The differences between Ecology of Mind and the paradigm of modernity are based in the non-objective 637 
vision of reality that is in Bateson’s proposal (1972, p. 271); yet, he does not share a soliptist idealism. What 638 
he proposes is that the living world is co-constructed in several networked and hiearchical levels. Therefore 639 
the ecology of mind is decentralised from the subject-self, moving away from theories focused on the power 640 
of the individual mind and of the strength of the isolated subject (Bateson, 1972, p. 470). 641 
6. On the other hand, Bateson consideres that, only when humans assumed to be powerless (Bateson, 1972, 642 
p. 331), can they effectively communicate not only with other humans, but mainly with other living beings, in 643 
the sever level and plans (whether vertical or horizontal). Thus his approval of religious positions, even 644 
though he was agnostic (Lipset, 1980). Understanding that we are not the only authors in our lives implies a 645 
                                                          
23
 "[…] The whole base of aesthetics will need to be re-examined. It seems that we link feelings not only to the 
computations of the heart but also to computations in the external pathways of the mind. It is when we recognize the 
operations of creatura in the external world that we are aware of 'beauty' or 'ugliness'" (Bateson, 1972, pp. 470-471). 
24
 "[...] There are the problems of how we know anything, or more specifically, how we know what sort of a world it is 
and what sort of creatures we are that can know something (or perhaps nothing) of this matter. These are the problems of 
epistemology" (Bateson, 1972, p.  313). 
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great responsibility. In a mechanistic epistemology, based on the duality me-other (human-nature, etc) 646 
common responsibility is difficult to assume. 647 
7. Some distrust that he may demonstrate towards ecological movements of his time draw from, I think, 648 
two factors: a) the contruction of ecological theories still based on duality, where ‘mother’ nature exists as 649 
something differentiated and hypostasised of the human being (Harries-Jones 1995, p. 120), and b) its power 650 
to annihilate us if we do not submit to it. There is also a naiveté in some ecological discourses that 651 
decentralise us from the danger of mental disruption (runaway); not all that exits is love and kindness, and not 652 
even the mechanisms of self-regulation can always resist (Bateson, 1972, pp. 491-492). 653 
8. The existence of a unified science of the living world, named Ecology of Mind, demands a lot more than 654 
the requisites here enunciated since it requires that we think, and most importantly act, in a different manner 655 
on a daily basis. Despite knowing what epistemological premises we should change, we have to incorporate 656 
them in order to be able to communicate immersed in them (Bateson, 1972, p. 469). 657 
 658 
 659 
 Conclusion 660 
 661 
For Bateson, the concept of mind has several meanings, all of them interconnected. One purpose of this article 662 
was to analyze each of the senses of this polysemic word, be it in science or philosophy. The contemporary 663 
advances in areas such as neurology have not been able to clarify a lot of the “fog” (to use an expression of 664 
our author Bateson, 1972, p. 15) involving this concept.  665 
The article is also intended to underline how ideas are often reinvented and used in varying contexts. 666 
Sciences are largely constructed in this way. As Kuhn demonstrated, scientific minorities frequently renew 667 
ideas in the process of developing new paradigmatic axioms. Tracing the genealogy of these conceptual and 668 
historical concepts and putting them into the context in which they operate constitute a scientific 669 
responsibility. They also have ethical implications and say something being a good member of a community.  670 
("Every schoolboy knows"....: Bateson, 1979). 671 
     Bateson took this task seriously and, in every step of his multifaceted work, he contributed to it with 672 
extraordinary wisdom, seeking to connect and integrate his findings within the widest of contexts, the 673 
universe. His research into ontogenetic learning is a noteworthy example of this, guiding us to the awareness 674 
of the community dimension even within the biological dimension of human beings by demonstrating the 675 
direct connection with communicative phenomena, both verbal and nonverbal. 676 
The more a person advances in ontogenetic learning more he distances himself from the idea of an 677 
individual self as axis mundi, so characteristic of modern epistemology; in so doing he discovers that learning 678 
and communicating define the Mind, but it does not exhaust its meaning at the community level. In the de-679 
centering of the self, the person finds Mind as that which hosts, integrates, links and simultaneously 680 
differentiates into numerous composite sub-unities, comprising an all round highly complex. Hence his 681 
ecstasic aesthetical stance, by which he sees us as immersed in something beautiful and magnificent. But this 682 
wisdom requires a deliverance from self, a risky dilution of oneself that few are willing to accept. 683 
How to articulate these various ways of acting and understanding the Mind? Bateson gave important 684 
impetus to this trans-disciplinary project and has subsequently left us with the arduous work of continuing it 685 
for the good of all, not just scientists. 686 
 687 
 688 
References 689 
 690 
AAVV (coord. Y. Winkin) (1981). La nouvelle communication. Paris: Seuil.  691 
AAVV (ed. J. Hoffmeyer) (2008). A legacy for living systems. Gregory Bateson as precursor to Biosemiotics. 692 
Dordrecht: Springer. 693 
BATESON, G. (1936). Naven. Cambridge: Cambrige university press. 694 
BATESON, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. London: Chandler publications. 695 
BATESON, G. (1979). Mind and nature – a necessary unity. New York: Bantam books. 696 
CASSELL, E. (2004). The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 697 
CHARLTON. N. (2008). Understanding Gregory Bateson. Mind, beauty, and the sacred earth. New York: 698 
State university  of New York press. 699 
16 
 
 
FAST, J. (1970). Body Language. New York: Pocket Books. 700 
HARRIES-JONES, P. (1995). Ecological understanding and Gregory Bateson. Toronto: University of 701 
Toronto Press. 702 
LIPSET, D. (1980). Gregory Bateson. The legacy of a scientist. Englewood Cliffs: NJ. Prentice Hall. 703 
OLIVEIRA, C. C. (2009). Da cibernética à autopoiesis; continuidades e descontinuidades. Informática na 704 
educação: teoria & prática, 30(2), 23-34. 705 
QUINE, W.  (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press.  706 
RORTY, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: University of Princeton Press. 707 
 708 
